The process to select candidates has concluded, ballots are printed, campaigning started a few days ago, and election day is ahead. On June 1st, for the first time in the country’s history, Mexicans will elect their judges.
The 2024 Constitutional Judicial Reform was introduced with the argument that the popular vote is the right path to restore legitimacy and public trust in the country’s Judiciary. Accordingly, the election of judges will enhance their performance, increase judicial transparency, and diminish the influence of elites over the Judiciary. More importantly, elected judges are expected to be more responsive to the concerns of everyday citizens and to better portray the country’s cultural, social, and ideological diversity.[1]
The question now is whether the votes Mexicans cast in a few months will offer the same guarantees of reliability and integrity as past electoral processes. This article examines the key challenges posed by this Judicial Reform, focusing on two main aspects: the selection of candidates and the unfolding of the election itself.
- Selection of Candidates
One of the major challenges of this unprecedented judicial election was to ensure a level playing field for those competing for the various judicial positions —especially given that nearly 50,000 people registered to become candidates.
Since judicial candidacies are not promoted by political parties, but rather by the three branches of government (Legislative, Executive, and Judicial), the Evaluation Committees established by each branch were crucial in identifying the most competent and diverse candidates while upholding the constitutional mandate of gender parity.
1) Parity
Reducing the gender gap within the Federal Judiciary (PJF, for its acronym in Spanish) was one of the few clearly identifiable opportunities posed by this reform, given that seven out of every ten judicial positions are currently held by men.[2] However, this goal faced obstacles from the outset due to established barriers and their effects, which are likely to persist even after election day.
The “Open Call for Applications to the Judicial Election” (Open Call), issued by the Senate as coordinator of this initial stage, failed to lay out clear gender parity rules within the nomination process. Instead, it delegated the responsibility to the Evaluation Committees, tasking them with ensuring parity. Additionally, it authorized the National Electoral Institute (INE, for its acronym in Spanish) to issue complementary regulation on the subject.
As a result, the opportunity to promote women’s participation on equal footing was lost. Worse still, there were no affirmative actions or protections for women who had already attained judicial positions.[3] For instance, of the 184 women currently serving as magistrates, 74 were selected to be replaced through the same lottery as their male counterparts. Likewise, of the 266 female judges, 101 were drawn to be renewed, leaving the existing gender imbalance in the Judiciary essentially intact.
Going forward, for each seat currently held by a woman, the rules allowed each Evaluation Committee to determine its approach to ensure parity in candidate nominations. This process ultimately resulted in a gender-balanced list. According to the document submitted by the Senate to INE, 1,317 of the 2,844 candidacies —representing 46.31%— are women.[4]
However, the structural imbalance of the Federal Judiciary persists, as the selection of judicial positions was randomized and lacked any gender-gap-correcting logic. For instance, the Open Call for Applications could have ensured that women’s judicial positions were protected before the lottery to correct underrepresentation.
The issue reached the High Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF, for its acronym in Spanish), but most justices dismissed the challenges arguing that the request was untimely, since the Evaluation Committees had already been formed and aspirants’ registration was underway. Thus, it was impossible to reverse the contested positions for the 2025 extraordinary elections.[5]
In this regard, the INE did issue parity criteria that include post-election adjustments.[6] This means that some male candidates, who receive the most votes, may ultimately not take office. These last-minute measures are almost certain to trigger hundreds of legal challenges, as they may be seen as infringing both: the authenticity of the voters’ choice and citizens’ right to be elected.
2) Suitability of Candidates
The Senate’s Open Call allowed each Evaluation Committee to define, within itself, the guidelines by which candidates would be deemed suitable. This gave way to three separate sets of standards for evaluating the same positions, which created uncertainty and unequal conditions for the participants.[7]
With three different criteria being used to assess candidates, doubts persisted. As a result, participants were unsure about how each Committee would determine whether or not the constitutional requirements were met. This lack of uniformity led to different complaints filed before the Electoral Tribunal. The common concern across these challenges was, precisely, that the Committees employed different methods to assess the exact same constitutional requirements.
For instance, one Committee required that the statement of purpose essay be exactly three pages long, while another accepted essays up to three pages, treating the page limit as a maximum value instead of a fixed requirement.[8] Such discrepancies in the interpretation and application of identical constitutional requirements led to widespread inconsistencies and opened the door to unfair competition. In turn, candidates were subject to differentiated treatment depending on which branch of government was evaluating their application.
Beyond these disparities, the Evaluation Committees functioned more as administrative conduits than true evaluators. Although these bodies were charged with identifying the best qualified and suitable profiles for the position, many complaints showed that their work had focused on overviewing only the basic fulfillment of the constitutional requirements.[9] In many cases, merely meeting those requirements was enough to place the participant on the list of pre-qualified profiles.
3) Single Candidates
The Constitution[10] states that each branch of government may nominate up to three candidates for each of the nine seats of the Supreme Court of Justice, the five seats of the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal, and the seven seats of the High Chamber of the TEPJF. For each contested seat of a Court of Appeals, Circuit or District Court, each branch may present up to two candidates.
As part of the candidate selection process, a lottery-style draw —known as insaculación— was used to determine which names would appear on the ballot. Despite the possibility of up to two or three candidates per office, in several cases, the Evaluation Committees selected only one person by lottery, even though multiple suitable participants were included in the pre-qualification lists from which the lottery was drawn. This decision effectively transformed the Evaluation Committees into de facto voters. The constitutional model does not imply that these bodies can exclude suitable people when enough spaces are available on the ballot. Such actions undermine the purpose of the Judicial Reform itself, which, according to its own rationale, establishes that this change was made to bring citizens closer to the Judiciary. By limiting the pool of candidates beyond the constitutional mandate, the Committees restricted voters’ ability to choose from all viable options.
4) Post-Lottery List Omissions and Denied Corrections
Regarding the process of insaculación, several participants reported that, even after being drawn, their names were missing from the final lists. Others noted that there were still available spots, yet they were excluded without explanation. Some of them filed complaints before the TEPJF requesting to be reinstated. Although there was still time to address the issue, a majority of the justices ruled that it was procedurally too late to make any corrections. In other words, they held that even if the claims were valid, the stage of the process made it unfeasible to fix the error.
This decision is especially troubling when compared to similar cases handled in ordinary elections, particularly those involving political party candidates. In such instances, electoral authorities have sometimes ordered corrections even after the ballots were printed. In this case, however, the TEPJF adopted a more restrictive position, prioritizing procedural timing over the fundamental right to be elected.
This shows that selecting and registering candidates experienced several problems that reveal a deeper pattern: the preference for giving the three branches of government as much influence as possible over who would appear on the ballot. While that level of influence might be expected in elections for political office, the judicial process was meant to move away from the logic of political control.
In fact, one purpose of this constitutional reform was to prevent the heads of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches from arbitrarily choosing judges and magistrates. On the contrary, it aimed to create fair and equitable conditions for competition among candidates with the appropriate legal and technical expertise, so that citizens could make informed choices under the best possible conditions.
- Implementation of the Judicial Election
Beyond the limitations in candidate selection, Mexican voters will face different obstacles when it comes to actually exercising their vote.
1) Judicial Electoral Districting
One of the first challenges for voters in this judicial election is simply knowing which positions they will be voting for and why those positions are assigned to their region. Unlike other elections, where people know they’re voting for a president, governor, or legislator, this process introduces a new and unfamiliar structure.
To organize the vote, INE divided the country into 60 judicial electoral districts —new and specific zones created solely for this election. These districts do not align with the 300 single-member districts used in other national elections, such as those for the presidency, Congress, or state governments. Nor do they correspond to the 32 judicial circuits defined by the Federal Judiciary Council, which determine the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts based on legal and administrative criteria, not electoral representation.
Because these new judicial districts were drawn without following existing political or judicial boundaries, the result is not just confusion, but an imbalance that affects the value of each vote. For instance, over half (52%) of the judicial positions up for elections are amassed in just 8 of Mexico’s 32 states, and the number of districts assigned to each state does not reflect the size of its population or voter base. This means that a vote cast in one region may carry more weight than a vote cast in another —a distortion that undermines the democratic principle of “one person, one vote”.
It is worth noting that many citizens will not be able to vote in this election. Mexicans living abroad —who can usually vote in presidential and congressional elections— have been excluded from participating.
2) Ballot Design and a Single Ballot Box
Secondly, several concerns about potential difficulties during the voting process on election day have been dismissed. On the one hand, the ballot design is complex, featuring dozens of options from which voters must choose and write the number corresponding to their preferred candidate on a single ballot. A clear example is the ballot for district judges, where citizens are required to write a single number for different judges across various fields. Since the candidates are not organized by field, voters may become confused and accidentally vote for more judges in a specific field than allowed, potentially invalidating their vote.
On the other hand, voters will have to place more than six ballots into a single ballot box, which could make both the voting and counting processes inefficient. This differs from ordinary elections, where there is one ballot for each elected office, and each ballot is placed into a separate box.
The majority of electoral justices dismissed the lawsuits raising these issues, without even considering whether it would be appropriate to instruct the INE to implement adjustments that could reduce the risk of human error.[11]
3) Communication Model
Thirdly, one of the main obstacles that citizens will face in this election is the lack of a state-sponsored communication’s model that enables judicial candidates to present their profile and proposals on a national scale. In Mexico, the State controls some television and radio airtime, meant to inform the public about diverse government programs and decisions. During regular elections, this airtime is used by political parties and its candidates to communicate their platforms.
However, due to the large number of candidates and unique nature of the judicial election, the model was adapted. Far from having a wide platform that presents the plurality of candidacies to citizens —giving them clear, timely, and relevant information— the approved Political Communication Model for this Judicial Election is limited to broadcasting generic institutional messages, which lack substantive content about the profiles and agendas of those running for a judgeship.
In a national context marked by deep digital divides, this omission is far from minor. By restricting the use of the most accessible media —radio and television— the judicial electoral process risks unfolding with low public visibility and scarce social understanding, both of the candidates and of judicial institutions themselves.
The lack of traditional campaigns and the limited media coverage contribute to a scenario in which voters will go to the polls without sufficient knowledge to cast a free and informed vote. The current communication design reflects a top-down approach, treating citizens as passive recipients and directing them to digital platforms for information. However, the access to online resources remains limited —or entirely absent— for many Mexicans.
Hence, this scheme shirks institutional responsibility and misses the opportunity to offer citizens fair and equal access to information on all candidates. Instead, the communication model is reduced to a mere formalism. In fact, it denies citizens the possibility to know, evaluate, and compare those seeking to become judges. In an election with no precedent, this omission amounts to a structural failure that threatens the democratic integrity of the process.
4) An Election Without Polling Place Representatives and Protection for Unused Ballots
Finally, some core guarantees that normally ensure certainty and transparency in Mexican elections have been set aside in this process.
The first of these guarantees is that electoral authorities have determined that candidates cannot have polling place representatives, as happens in ordinary elections.[12] Although the law does not specifically regulate this issue in judicial elections, the absence of an explicit prohibition could allow for the application of ordinary electoral processes norms by analogy.[13] The presence of representatives would help uphold the integrity of the election by enabling oversight of vote counting and computation, as well as the verification of possible irregularities that could later be challenged in court.
This concern is linked to another issue: the electoral authorities’ decision on how to handle the unused ballots on election day. The law stipulates that when voting hours end, election officials at polling places must mark unused ballots with two diagonal ink stripes and store them in a special sealed envelope, noting the number of ballots contained. This mechanism is designed to prevent the manipulation of unused ballots.[14] However, this and other provisions ensuring certainty and integrity were set aside, as they were not explicitly included in the regulations for judicial elections, even though they could have been applied based on general norms governing elections.
A third issue is that citizens at polling stations will no longer count the votes at the end of election day; instead district councils will take this responsibility. Citizen participation has been a key element in building confidence in elections and legitimizing the authorities elected from them. Therefore, excluding citizens from the vote counting process —when a systematic interpretation of the law would have supported maintaining their role as in ordinary elections— eliminates a fundamental component of the Mexican electoral system: the citizenry involvement.
Conclusions
Much has been said about the potential harm that this Judicial Reform could inflict on the country’s justice system —mainly, how it fails to address the shortcomings of the existing Judiciary, shaped during Mexico’s democratic transition, and how it can further weaken the Rule of Law. However, as this op-ed illustrates, the first negative consequence is already evident: this judicial election seems to devalue the vote and underestimate citizens. The very system that promised a more democratic Judiciary through the popular election of judges has, paradoxically, sidelined the People.
Nexos | By The Editorial Board
[1] Executive Branch Initiative on Judicial Reform, presented on February 5, 2024. Available at: https://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/PDF/65/2024/feb/20240205-15.pdf
[2] See: INMUJERES. «SIS Proigualdad.» Cited in the Agreement of the General Council of the INE INE/CG65/2025. Available at: https://repositoriodocumental.ine.mx/pdfjs-flipbook/web/viewer.html?file=/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/179152/CG2ex202502-10-ap-Unico.pdf
[3] See dissenting vote of justice Reyes Rodríguez Mondragón in case file SUP-JDC-1032/2024.
[4] See INE (2025). List of Candidates for the Positions to Be Elected in the Extraordinary Electoral Process of the Federal Judiciary 2024-2025 (public version). Available at https://ine.mx/listado-candidaturas/ (accessed: March 20, 2025).
[5] See judgment in case file SUP-JDC-625/2025 Y ACUMULADOS.
[6]According to the INE’s criteria, for each position to be elected, two lists will be created: one for men and one for women, separated by specialty in each judicial district. The candidacies will be ranked in descending order by the number of votes. Positions will then be assigned, starting with a woman, alternated by specialty in the district. In cases where there is a vacancy by specialty in a district, the position may be assigned to a man if he received more votes and there is no male majority in the district. Otherwise, the position must be assigned to a woman. After the assignment process, the INE will verify that gender parity exists within each specialty of the judicial circuit.
[7] In fact, this issue was contested; however, a majority of the justices of the High Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary ruled that the varying criteria were valid, as stated in the judgment of case file SUP-JDC-1204/2024 Y ACUMULADOS.
[8] As detailed by case file SUP-JDC-59/2025 Y ACUMULADOS.
[9] Many complaints filed before the Electoral Tribunal argued that, despite candidates meeting the constitutional requirements and the Committee’s rule for interviews, they were not called or further vetted. However, all justices upheld that the Committee was not obligated to interview all qualified applicants. Each Committee had discretion over whom to select for an interview, as stated in the judgment of case file SUP-JDC-0593/2025.
[10] As foreseen by paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 96 of the Mexican Constitution.
[11] As judged in case file SUP-JDC-1186/2025 Y ACUMULADOS.
[12] As judged in case file SUP-JDC-1240/2025 Y ACUMULADOS.
[13] As foreseen by articles 259, 260, 261, 264, 265, 275, 280, 282, and 298 of the Mexican General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures (LEGIPE, for its acronym in Spanish).
[14] Article 290 of LEGIPE.